Assessing NATO's Eastern European "Flank"

Abstract

Abstract: Russia's annexation of Crimea and ongoing efforts to de-stabilize Ukraine have led NATO and the US to adopt a number of initiatives aimed at reassuring and Central European allies. This article assesses the implications of those initiatives for NATO's evolving position in Europe. It also appraises the Alliance's renewed focus on defense and deterrence with respect to European and transatlantic capabilities. ********** The aim of this article is to assess NATO's evolving geostrategic position in Europe in the context of a resurgent Russia. (1) A Admittedly, the military-strategic level is but one aspect of Russia's resurgence. Although Russian military power did play an important part in the annexation of Crimea and subsequent de-stabilization of Ukraine, Moscow is showing a clear preference for non-traditional ways and means when it comes to expanding its influence across Europe, including energy blackmail, the use of undercover assets (the so-called little green men), financial penetration, cyber-attacks, and information warfare. This is particularly true in the case of and Central European countries covered by NATO's mutual defense guarantee. In this regard, economic and political means are likely to become central to any Western response or strategy aimed at countering Russian influence in Europe. Having said this, Central and European perceptions of Russian power are largely mediated by the evolving military-strategic balance. Thus, the latter provides a sort of superstructure or framework within which geopolitical competition in Europe plays out. This article looks at Europe's Eastern primarily from a geostrategic perspective. The opening section examines some of the main initiatives adopted by NATO's Heads of State and Government at the September 2014 Summit in Wales, and assesses their contribution to defense and deterrence in Europe. The second section seeks to place these initiatives within a broader geostrategic context, by breaking down the so-called eastern flank into three sub-components or sub-theaters: the Baltic Sea; the Black Sea; and the continental northeastern European flank. It identifies the main geostrategic vulnerabilities NATO faces in each sub-theater and suggests possible ways to overcome them. The third and final section looks at the implications of NATO's renewed emphasis on defense and deterrence for European and transatlantic discussions on capability development, and offers some broader reflections on what the of the crisis management paradigm might mean for Western military strategy. NATO Reloaded? The 2014 Wales Summit Arguably, the main outcome from the 2014 Wales summit was the return of defense and deterrence in Europe to the center of NATO debates. (2) This does not mean the era of Western expeditionary military operations has come to pass. However, Russia's annexation of Crimea in February 2014 and subsequent meddling in Ukraine has aggravated a sense of insecurity amongst NATO's Central and European allies, and prompted the Alliance to place a renewed emphasis on defense and deterrence in an Flank context. A clear illustration of this fact was NATO's decision in Wales to adopt the Readiness Action Plan, to ensure the Alliance will be able to react to crises swiftly and firmly. The backbone of the Readiness Action Plan will be a new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force of some 4,000-6,000 troops, which should be able to deploy to the front line within a matter of days. (3) Credibility will hinge on the existence of appropriate reception facilities, logistics and equipment in each of the allied countries situated on the European front-line. It will also require the construction of bases and fuel and ammunition depots that can be used on short notice. More particularly, streamlining the Alliance's command and control infrastructure in Central and Europe will be key to the success of the Readiness Action Plan. …