Abstract
The counterfactual comparative account of harm and benefit (CCA) has several virtues, but it also faces serious problems. I argue that CCA is incompatible with the prudential and moral relevance of harm and benefit. Some possible ways to revise or restrict CCA, in order to avoid this conclusion, are discussed and found wanting. Finally, I try to show that appealing to the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals, or to the alleged contrastive nature of harm and benefit, does not provide a solution.
Highlights
The counterfactual comparative account of harm and benefit (CCA) has several virtues, but it faces serious problems
The aim of this paper is to show that CCA is incompatible with the prudential and moral relevance of harm and benefit
Since it seems implausible to deny that harm and benefit are prudentially and morally relevant, this is a serious problem for CCA
Summary
The counterfactual comparative account of harm and benefit (CCA): An event e or action a harms (benefits) a person overall if and only if she would have been on balance better (worse) off if e had not occurred, or a had not been performed. Interpretation 2: A possible event e would harm (benefit) a person if and only if she is worse (better) off in the nearest e-world, we, than in the non-e-world that is nearest to we. According to Interpretation 1, this event would benefit you just in case you are better off in the world where you escape from the camp, than in the actual world. This would have injured me even worse In this case of what appears to be Bpreemptive harm^, CCA implies that you benefit me by hitting me with your fist. Many would find this conclusion plainly false.
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