Abstract
is that, whatever it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. In Warrant Entails Truth (PPR, December 1995), I argued that it is impossible that a false belief be warranted. Sharon Ryan attacked the argument of that paper in her Does Entail Truth? (PPR, March 1996). In More on Warrant's Entailing Truth I present arguments for the claim that warrant entails truth that are, I think, significantly more compelling than the arguments of my original Warrant Entails Truth. This paper responds to Ryan's objections, but it is not merely a reply to Ryan's article. It is, rather, a free-standing defense of warrant's entailing truth that is the product of discussion and argument for over two years with many philosophers, including Ryan, over the arguments contained in my original paper.
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