More Is Not Better

Abstract

Given the size, composition, and essential missions of our current strategic force, I believe that we do not now need a new ICBM. At present, it is only necessary to proceed with an ICBM technology program. We can then begin full-scale engineering development if and when the specific needs for deployment become more evident. Our strategic arsenal will be more than adequate if we assume that it will be augmented by the currently programmed 50 MX missiles in fixed silos and 100 B-lBs, that the Trident procurement continues, and that we proceed with the development of a Stealth bomber and a second generation of air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). The pressure to increase our nuclear forces arises from our tendency to assume that military strength derives from numbers and details of weapons performance. Marginal differences in technical capability of weapons for conventional warfare can substantially affect the outcome of battles and of wars. But marginal differences in the strategic nuclear capabilities of the U.S. and the Soviet Union are inconsequential, except politically. Most would agree that by far the most important role of the U.S. strategic force is to deter a nuclear attack by an adversary. A degree of flexibility in the way that force can be used also provides deterrence against extreme nonnuclear provocations. But beyond a certain point, the idea of broadening the utility of nuclear weapons by being able to fight nuclear wars of varying intensity and to prevail in protracted nuclear wars is more problematic. It seems almost superfluous to point out yet again that the current retaliatory capability and the flexibility of use of nuclear weapons of each superpower is more than adequate for basic deterrence and can be readily maintained. Only if it totally neglected its nuclear forces-an unimaginable situation-could either side lose its retaliatory capability and the flexibility sufficient to extend deterrence. In fact, the pursuit of ever greater flexibility, of longer and specialized target lists, and of superiority in every imaginable level of nuclear conflict