Abstract
When performing intertemporal cost-benefit analyses of policies, both in terms of climate change and other long-term problems, the discounting problem becomes critical. The question is how to weight intertemporal costs and benefits to generate present value equivalents. This thesis argues that those best placed to answer the discounting problem are domain experts, not moral philosophers or the public at large. It does this by arguing that the discounting problem is a special case of an interesting class of problems, those which are both what I call morally complex and quantitative.
Highlights
The moral parameters in the Ramsey Rule are δ and η (Ramsey 1928)
The thesis distinguishes between strong and weak moral expertise, where strong moral experts can be thought of as those who can morally reason in a sound manner, whereas weak moral experts can be thought of as those who can morally reason in a valid manner (Chapter 3)
I argue that weak moral expertise is more appropriate in a pluralistic society where strong moral experts cannot reliably be identified
Summary
The moral parameters in the Ramsey Rule are δ and η (Ramsey 1928). The primary argument of the thesis is that there is a lack of philosophical theory or argumentation supporting particular parameter value assignments for problems satisfying the two criteria—that is, the problems are quantitative and morally complex (Chapter 2). Morally complex problems are ones that presume particular moral theories (they come from what I call ethically explicit domains), but those moral theories alone are insufficient to determine particular value assignments. Since morally complex problems presume particular moral theories, they obviate the need for application of alternative moral theories.
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