Moral thinking, sports rules and education1

The relation between the two levels of moral thinking, and how we know when to think at one level and when to think at the other is best explained in terms of our use of critical thinking to select the best set of prima facie principles for use in intuitive thinking. Critical thinking has epistemological priority over, and governs, the intuitive level. In moral reasoning, we need to select moral principles before we can establish substantial criteria of relevance for the principles—it is the principle that determines what is relevant. Hare argues that in addition to the properties of universalizability and prescriptivity for moral judgements, an additional distinguishing property of overridingness is required to differentiate evaluative judgements from moral judgements.

Hare introduces a distinction between two levels of moral thinking; the first being the intuitive and the second being the critical. These levels of moral thinking are concerned with moral questions of substance, but they handled them differently, each appropriate to the different circumstances in which, and purposes for which, the thinking is done. The intuitive level of thinking is concerned with the ordinary, day‐to‐day evaluation of the moral status of different acts. The critical level of thinking consists of making a choice under the constraints imposed by the logical properties of the moral concept under question. The explanation of these two moral levels is done by discussing the problem of moral conflicts. It is argued that moral conflicts are possible at the intuitive level, but not at the critical level.

R. M. Hare has argued for and defended a ‘two-level’, view of moral agency. He argues that moral agents ought to rely on the rules of ‘intuitive moral thinking’ for their ‘everyday’ moral judgments. When these rules conflict or when we do not have a rule at hand, we ought to ascend to the act-utilitarian,‘critical’ level of moral thinking. I argue that since the rules at the intuitive level of moral thinking necessarily conflict much more often than Hare supposes, and since we often do not have ready-made rules for our moral judgments, we must necessarily use critical moral thinking very frequently. However, act-utilitarian judgements at this level will sharply conflict with our strongly held ‘intuitive’ moral convictions. I show that Hare’s attempt to balance these two aspects of moral judgment requires us to simultaneously adopt two conflicting sets of moral standards, and thus an attempt to inculcate such standards constitutes a ‘schizophrenic’ moral education. Finally, I briefly outline an alternative conception of moral education, based on Aristotelian phronesis.

This study aimed to validate the psychometric properties of the Sociomoral Reflection Measure - Short Form Objective (SRM-SFO) in Kuwait. The participants were 218 Kuwait University students, 64 males, and 154 females, with an average age 23.70 years and a standard deviation of 6.01. The researchers validated the psychometric efficiency of the study scale. This study showed a high internal consistency stability coefficient using Cronbach's alpha method (0.89). It also appeared that the correlation coefficients Between each item and the total score of the scale were mostly high and significant. There were significant differences in the average’s degrees of apparent aggression due to the two levels of moral thinking (mature and immature) in the direction of the level of immature moral thinking. The results also showed significant differences between males and females in the percentage of individuals at the fourth level of moral thinking for females. This indicates the psychometric efficiency of the Measure (SRM-SFO) in Kuwaiti society.

This paper delves into the ethical tensions present in Ann Cleeves' Raven Black through the lens of David Ross' The Right and the Good, focusing specifically on the character of Magnus Tait and his relationship with his mother. Ross' theory of prima facie duties—obligations that are morally binding unless outweighed by a more pressing duty—serves as a framework to explore Magnus' moral conflict. Magnus Tait, an isolated figure within the Shetland community, is deeply influenced by his duty to his mother that shapes his actions and perceptions. Ross' philosophy emphasizes that individuals often face conflicting duties, requiring careful moral reasoning to determine which duty takes precedence. In Raven Black, Magnus' sense of obligation to his mother—rooted in loyalty, care, and obedience—conflicts with his own needs and the expectations of the broader community. This paper explores how Magnus' duty to his mother becomes a source of internal conflict, particularly as it intersects with his loneliness and the suspicions cast upon him by the community. His sense of duty is further complicated by the harsh judgment of the society around him, which exacerbates his isolation and highlights the moral ambiguities in his character. Through the lens of Ross' ethical theory, Magnus' struggles are portrayed not merely as personal dilemmas but as reflections of broader moral challenges, where duty and the concept of right are constantly in tension. By examining Magnus Tait's moral conflict in Raven Black through the principles outlined in Ross' principle of prima facie duties, this paper offers a nuanced understanding of how a prima facie duty can both bind and burden individuals, especially within the complex fabric of human relationships.

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هدفت الدراسة إلى التعرف على مستويات التفکير الأخلاقي وعلاقته بمهارة حل المشکلات لدى طلبة الصف الثالث ثانوي بتعليم محافظة القنفذة ، والتعرف على مهارة حل المشکلات لدى أفراد عينة الدراسة ,والتعرف على العلاقة بين مستوى التفکير الأخلاقي ومهارة حل المشکلات, والفروق ذات الدلالة الإحصائية بين التفکير الأخلاقي ومهارة حل المشکلات.وقد تکونت عينة الدراسة من (291) طالبا تم اختيارهم بطريقة عشوائية في الفصل الدراسي الأول من العام الدراسي 2018 / 2019، ولتحقيق أهداف الدراسة تم تطبيق أداتين: الأولى مقياس مستوى التفکير الأخلاقي وفق نظرية کولبرج من إعداد الباحث فوقية عبد الفتاح (2001), ومقياس مهارة حل المشکلات من إعداد نزيه حمدي (1998) بما يتناسب وأغراض الدراسة ، وقد أظهرت نتائج الدراسة أن مستوى التفکير الأخلاقي لدى عينة من طلبة الصف الثالث ثانوي بتعليم محافظة القنفذة, بشکل عام جاء بدرجة متوسطة کما أشارت نتائج الدراسة أيضا إلى أن مقدرة طلبة الصف الثالث ثانوي بتعليم محافظة القنفذة على حل المشکلات جاءت بدرجة متوسطة. کما أظهرت نتائج الدراسة وجود علاقة طردية موجبة بين مستوى التفکير الأخلاقي ومقدرة الطلبة على حل المشکلات 0 الکلمات المفتاحية : التفکير الأخلاقي , حل المشکلات, طلبة الصف الثالث ثانوي بإدارة تعليم القنفذة. Abstract: The study aimed to identify the levels of moral thinking and its relationship to the problem-solving skill of third-grade of secondary education in Al Qunfudah Governoratethe skill of solving problems among the members of the study sample, identifying the relationship between the level of moral thinking and theproblem-solving skill, and the statistically significant differences between ethical thinking and theProblem-solving skill. The sample of the study consisted of (291) students who were randomly chosen in the first semester of the academic year 2018/2019, to achieve the goals of the study of two tools were applied: The first is a measure of the level of moral thinking according to Kohlberg theory prepared by the researcher Fawkia Abdul-Fattah (2001) And thecriterion of the problem-solving skill, prepared by Nazih Hamdi (1998), as appropriate for the study's purposes, the results of the study showed that the level of moral thinking among a sample of third-grade students in secondary education in Al-Qunfudah Governorate, in general, came with an average degree, the results of the study also indicated that the ability of third-grade students in the AL Qunfudah education department to solve problems came with a moderate degree The study results also showed a positive correlation between the level of moral thinking and students' ability to solve problems.

Details how the logical properties of moral concepts help us to construct moral arguments. In ordinary moral thinking, we have our intuitive or prima facie principles to start from, and shall normally treat as prima facie relevant the features that figure in them; but because we cannot take our prima facie principles for granted in critical thinking, we must be prepared to consider other features besides these as candidates for relevancy. In discussing a way of thinking about moral questions critically and rationally, the question of our knowledge of what it is like to be somebody else who is suffering is examined. When we come to universalize our prescriptions, we have to consider only those prescriptions and preferences of others, which they would retain if they were always prudent.

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.在後設倫理學以至生命倫理學上，一直存在著脉絡主義與原則倫理之爭辧。脉絡主義者解決道德問題的方式，是首先審視個別事件發生的脉絡細節，作出道德判斷後再將之用於其他相類事件；原則倫理者卻試圖將一般的道德原則應用於特殊事件上。前者可視為一種「自下而上」的方式，後者則可名為「自上而下」。很多道德哲學家都指出這兩種進路各有利弊。R.M. Hare藉著引介兩層道德思維結構，來論證上述二者其實並不矛盾，相反地，它們在不同的道德思維層面，分別扮演重要角色。在本文中，我嘗試檢視Hare的論証是否成立，又是否會在實踐上引生另外的問題。最後，我將指出，中國的儒家倫理中的「經」、「權」觀念，如何可以幫助解決詠絡主義與原則倫理的問題。There has been controversy between particularism and generalism in metaethics in general and bioethics in particular. Particularists (e.g. contextualists) attempt to solve moral problems by firstly working with particular cases in all of their contextual details and then by applying these results to other similar cases, whereas generalists (principled ethicists) try to apply the general normative principles to particular cases. The former approach can be viewed as a "bottom-up" and the latter "top-down" way. As indicated by many moral philosophers, both of these approaches have shortcomings. Principled ethics have been challenged for their impotence in providing guidance in a moral decision. The challenge is in twofold: Firstly, there is scepticism that one can reach a moral judgment by reasoning deductively from general ethical principles; secondly, these theories are insensitive to and thus do not give due weight to the contextual variabilities in a specific situation. By contrast, contextualism emphasizes the relative importance of inductive method in moral reasoning. However, how to resolve moral issues by employing the inductive method remains a problem. Therefore, while it accuses principled ethics of its inability to guide moral decision, contextualism itself cannot provide any guidance.With respect to the rival views of principled ethics and contextualism, R.M. Hare thinks that both theories have grasped the truth, but only part of it. For instance, contextualism has caught hold of an important truth, that one has to judge each situation on its own merit. But if contextualism persists in asserting that in morals one cannot appeal to general principles, then it is mistaken. This is a mistaken view in that it ignores another obvious truth that some situations are similar in some morally relevant respects, and also in that it holds that these two truths are incompatible. Hare conceives that this mistake arises from confusing the concepts of universality and generality and also from failing to make the distinction between the two levels of moral thinking. By introducing the intuitive level and critical level of moral thinking, Hare argues that the two kinds of metaethical theories are not in real conflict. Contrarily, they both play important roles in our moral thinking, though at different levels. In this paper, I am going to examine to what extent, if ever, Hare's attempt is successful, and furthermore, what are the steps that should be taken to remedy the deficiency, if any. Finally, I try to show that the ideas of "jing" and "quan" in Confucian ethics operate in the two levels of moral thinking in Hare's structure, and hope that these two ideas may help to solve the issue discussed in this paper.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 23 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

Précis: <i>Concern, Respect, and Cooperation</i>

The current study aimed at identifying the level of moral thinking of gifted students in line with Kohlberg aspects. To achieve the study objectives the moral thinking scale was administered a sample of (115) male and female students from king Abdullah II gifted school in Zarqa city. Another sample of (118) normal male and female students in the same classes were included. The results indicated that the moral level of the sample was in the fourth Kohlberg level. No significant differences among gifted students were found due to gender. There were significant differences among gifted student due to class in favor of higher classes. However, there was no significant difference between gifted and normal students in the level of moral thinking. Students who came from families with great number of siblings outscored students who came from families with small number of siblings. Student order of birth had no significant effect on moral thinking. The researchers proposed recommendations based on the results

The current study aimed at identifying the level of moral thinking of gifted students in line with Kohlberg aspects. To achieve the study objectives the moral thinking scale was administered a sample of (115) male and female students from king Abdullah II gifted school in Zarqa city. Another sample of (118) normal male and female students in the same classes were included. The results indicated that the moral level of the sample was in the fourth Kohlberg level. No significant differences among gifted students were found due to gender. There were significant differences among gifted student due to class in favor of higher classes. However, there was no significant difference between gifted and normal students in the level of moral thinking. Students who came from families with great number of siblings outscored students who came from families with small number of siblings. Student order of birth had no significant effect on moral thinking. The researchers proposed recommendations based on the results

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Critical and Ethical Thinking in Sport Management: Philosophical Rationales and Examples of Methods

In this paper I wish to discuss two sorts of things that can easily go wrong in the transition from intuitive to critical thinking—that is, from the everyday moral thinking that suffices, and should suffice, for most of our moral thought, to the higher-level thinking that we have to do if we need to scrutinize the principles we are using at the intuitive level. This is a transition which in the course of our moral education we all have to learn to make if we are ever to get beyond intuitive moral thinking. I shall give to these two pitfalls in moral education the perhaps rather too dramatic names ‘Satanism’ and ‘Nihilism’. They both have some kinship with the amoralism that I discussed in MT, chs. 10 and 11; but they are different from it and from each other, though all three can be combined in various more or less confused mixtures. The discussion of these pitfalls will enable me both to clear up a theoretical difficulty which has often been raised against my views, and to shed some light on a pressing social problem.