Moral Responsibility of a Moral Agent: Descriptive and Normative Approaches

Abstract

The problem of moral responsibility occupies a key place in modern ethical studies. Based on the discussions formed in the academic field, the article considers the features of two main approaches to the definition of moral responsibility and the conditions for its onset: descriptive and normative. It is shown that despite the fact that the descriptive approach aspires for objectivity of imputation and ascription of moral responsibility, regardless of the specification of substantive moral requirements, it is still insufficient to explain the characterization of responsibility as moral. Therefore, the descriptive approach must necessarily be supplemented by a normative approach, so it becomes possible to define a moral agent not just as an object of responsibility, but also as an actor with the property of being morally responsible. The key to resolving the issue of different approaches to moral responsibility is to consider the concepts of strict and zero responsibility as specific conditions for imputing responsibility to an agent, which are impossible within the framework of an exclusively descriptive approach. It is shown that from an ethical perspective, these types of legal responsibility “without fault” imply normative attitudes towards actors who are considered as full-fledged moral agents. The ethical analysis of strict and zero responsibility demonstrates the conditions for the positive moral responsibility within the framework of the normative approach, namely the desire to maintain a normative order focused on maintaining the “good life”. The combined use of descriptive and normative approaches with simultaneous reference to the moral agent's own characteristics makes it possible to clarify the features of moral responsibility.