Moral Responsibility, Moral Sanctions, and the Value and Normative Content of Morality

Abstract

The paper deals with the problem of the role of moral of sanctions — an expression of retrospective moral responsibility — in the moral experience. Moral sanctions are negative consequences of a moral transgression or deviation that spring from their condemnation. This kind of sanctions includes public censure and self-censure. The author tries to establish whether the all content of morality is supported by moral sanctions. The first object of the analysis are moral norms (rules, requirements) creating obligations. There is an interesting precedent of splitting apart obligations and sanctions in H. Hart’s philosophy. Though Hart overlooks “the conceptual intuition that something can be genuinely obligatory only if those who are obligated can justifiably be held responsible or accountable for compliance” (S. Darwall). This intuition is deeply rooted in the moral consciousness and ethical thought (the most vivid examples — S. Pufendorf and J.S. Mill). But moral norms (rules, requirements) creating obligations are not the only element of the content of morality. Moral values have a capacity to influence the behavior of an agent not through norms (rules, requirements) but directly. R. Nozick supposed that there is a special type of sanction in this sphere (the so called “value sanction”). The author shows that it is not a sanction proper. The main conclusion of the paper is as follows: the moral space without sanctions and retrospective responsibility is the space there moral values influence the behavior of an agent not only directly but without overlapping with moral norms (rules, requirements). Supererogation fits the bill perfectly.