Abstract
Abstract We have found that collective action theory, as developed by Margaret Levi and others, provides a new direction for the study of growth and decline of premodern states. By following this lead, we have challenged the traditional consensus that despotic rule characterized most premodern states, demonstrating instead the existence of a state-building process in which fiscal economies of joint production fostered the implementation of good government such as accountable leadership and public goods. In this paper we focus attention on causes and consequences of state decline, highlighting the decline pattern found where there was good government. Our investigation reveals that while regimes providing good government policies and practices were highly regarded by citizens and brought benefits to them, they were not always highly endurable and regime decline was frequently followed by serious demographic and economic consequences. While causes of decline were varied, we describe and comment on four well-documented examples in which primary causality can be traced to a principal leadership that inexplicably abandoned well-established principles of state-building, while also ignoring their expected roles as effective leaders and moral exemplars.
Highlights
The goal of this paper is to build on in-depth, cross-cultural comparative studies of premodern states to propose a novel perspective on the causes of state collapse
We found that states with stronger commitments to good government were no more enduring than autocratic polities and, were more vulnerable to what we define as a “major” collapse pattern
That fiscal economy had a profound impact on state-building is evident when we looked at the mean values of our Good Government Sum variable split by predominantly joint or nonjoint fiscal economy (p = 0.0001, n = 30, using a two-tailed t-Test of difference of means) [(Blanton et al, in press); sources, codes and data to replicate are found in Blanton and Fargher (2008)] (Figure 2)
Summary
The goal of this paper is to build on in-depth, cross-cultural comparative studies of premodern states (especially Blanton and Fargher, 2008) to propose a novel perspective on the causes of state collapse. We link differing degrees of collective action to variable expressions of premodern state-building along an axis defined by the degree of good government policies and practices, following the criteria of Rothstein (Rothstein, 2011, 2014) and others. The theoretical lens that we employ predicts that states organized on the basis of collective action and good government provide collective benefits, but only insofar as leaders and citizens honor their mutual moral commitments (Levi, 1988). We found that states with stronger commitments to good government were no more enduring than autocratic polities and, were more vulnerable to what we define as a “major” collapse pattern (including social unrest, agrarian collapse, and state failure). Moral Collapse and State Failure collective action, owing to the mutual moral commitments between leaders and taxpayers, have a heightened vulnerability to major collapse when their leaders undermine the trust and confidence of taxpayers through amoral actions
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
