Abstract
The classical Aristotelean distinction between moral and intellectual virtues has come to us as one of the first explicit conceptualizations of a realm of knowledge and a realm of action. This paper intends to analyze the meaning of that distinction according to an alternative hypothesis, namely, that the moral and intellectual virtues correspond to a profound understanding of the relation between the philosophical and the political life. The analysis will be guided by the relatively unclear relation between phrónesis and sophía, and by the subtle but remarkable differences that Thomas Aquinas introduces in his systematization of virtues, e.g., his explicit flight from this life as the goal of contemplation. Aquinas’ understanding of theoría or contemplation will shed light on the basis of Aristotle’s concern with virtues—the tension between philosophy and politics that must be mediated by a resourceful prudence.
Highlights
Leo Strauss concludes his commentary on Aristotle’s Politics by showing the “seeming self-contradiction regarding the highest theme”—the seeming fact that the highest end of man and the highest end of the city coincide
This paper intends to analyze the meaning of that distinction according to an alternative hypothesis, namely, that the moral and intellectual virtues correspond to a profound understanding of the relation between the philosophical and the political life
With this remarkable reflection in mind, we pose our hypothesis in advance— the Aristotelean distinction between moral and intellectual virtues is the result of a profound understanding of the relation between philosophy and politics, rather than a mere division of two kinds of knowledge, two realms of life, or two general faculties in the human soul
Summary
Leo Strauss concludes his commentary on Aristotle’s Politics (primarily on Books I-III) by showing the “seeming self-contradiction regarding the highest theme”—the seeming fact that the highest end of man and the highest end of the city coincide. Perhaps is even more shocking to say that contemplation (philosophy) entails a detachment from political life—something that Strauss suggests in his reflection— To this assertion one could immediately ask whether it is not a Christianized-anchoretic version of Aristotle’s understanding of politics, i.e., one can reasonably ask whether Aristotle, a sober gentleman who respected the commonsense of politics, who was quite interested in virtue, friendship, and the organization of the polis, could have regarded morality and politics as an impediment to philosophize. We hope those flimsy relations may be able to point to an accurate direction of the problem
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