Abstract

One of the most pressing challenges facing virtue theorists is the conflation problem. This problem concerns the difficulty of explaining the distinction between different types of virtue, such as the distinction between moral virtues and intellectual virtues. Julia Driver has argued that only an outcomes-based understanding of virtue can provide an adequate solution to the conflation problem. In this paper, I argue against Driver’s outcomes-based account, and propose an alternative motivations-based solution. According to this proposal, intellectual virtues can be identified by the shared motivation for cognitive contact with reality, while moral virtues are identified by appeal to the characteristic motivations of kindness and justice. I defend the proposal by demonstrating that it produces plausible verdicts concerning the virtue status of candidate moral and intellectual virtues.

Highlights

  • The concept of virtue is important for many current debates within philosophy

  • One of the key challenges facing virtue theorists can be labelled the conflation problem, and concerns the attempt to distinguish between different types of virtue

  • I will focus on the conflation problem as it applies to the supposed distinction between moral and intellectual virtues

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Summary

Introduction

The concept of virtue is important for many current debates within philosophy. The task of virtue theory – of giving an account of the virtues – is an especially pressing one. I will focus on the conflation problem as it applies to the supposed distinction between moral and intellectual (or epistemic) virtues. Julia Driver (2003) has recently argued against existing attempts to explain this distinction, and suggested that only an outcomes-based understanding of virtue can provide an adequate solution to the conflation problem. My aim in this paper is to argue against Driver’s outcomes-based account, and to propose an alternative motivationsbased solution.

The Conflation Problem
Rejecting Driver’s Outcomes-Based Approach
A Motivations-Based Approach to Identifying Intellectual Virtues
A Motivations-Based Approach to Identifying Moral Virtues
Testing the Proposed Distinction
Honesty
Modesty
Compassion
Further Implications
Findings
Conclusion
Full Text
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