Moral and Epistemic Virtues

Abstract

Introduction: Moral and Epistemic Virtues: Michael S. Brady (University of Stirling) and Duncan Pritchard (University of Stirling). Part I: Theory:. 1. The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good: Linda Zagzebski (University of Oklahoma). 2. The Pursuit of Epistemic Good: Philip Percival (University of Glasgow). 3. Epistemic Presuppositions and Their Consequences: Juli Eflin (Ball State University). 4. Traditional Epistemology Reconsidered: A Reply to Eflin: Andrew McGonigal (University of Leeds). 5. Affective States and Epistemic Immediacy: Christopher Hookway (University of Sheffield). 6. Reply to Hookway: Marie McGinn (University of York). 7. The Conflation of Moral and Epistemic Virtue: Julia Driver (Dartmouth College). 8. Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgement: Outline of a Project: Michael Slote (University of Miami). 9. Some Worries about Normative and Metaethical Sentimentalism: Michael S. Brady (University of Stirling). Part II: Application:. 1. Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing: Miranda Fricker (Birkbeck College, University of London). 2. Epistemic Injustice: The Third Way?: S. E. Marshall (University of Stirling). 3. Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue--Centred Theory of Judging: Lawrence B. Solum (Loyola Law School). 4. The Limits of Virtue Jurisprudence: R. A. Duff (University of Stirling). Part III: Symposia on Epistemic Luck:. 1. Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck: Duncan Pritchard (University of Stirling). 2. Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology: Guy Axtell (University of Nevada, USA). 3. Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise: John Greco (Fordham University, USA)