Abstract

The article elaborates on the concept of ethics, noting the contrasting definitions of morality virtue-based and rule-based ethics. It highlights the related distinction between virtue epistemology and rule epistemology, stating that the main difference lies in the appreciation of the ethics of belief by either discipline. It also discusses the claim by philosopher Linda Zagzebski that epistemology is a branch of ethics, focusing on the contrary arguments including the perspectives of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

Highlights

  • There is a well-known distinction between rule-based and virtue-based ethics

  • The right question is not “What are the criteria of the legitimate belief?”, but “What makes us confident in our belief?” We do not ask whether our belief is right or not by wondering whether some criterion has been respected

  • Not all virtue epistemologists agree about the kind of process that warrants knowledge

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Summary

The Argument from the Difference between Moral and Epistemic Duty

If I believe that today is Friday, that I am in France, that Aquinas died in AD 1274, etc., I cannot decide to believe that today is Saturday, that I am in Poland, or that Aquinas lived in the eighteenth century. The involuntariness of belief implies a radical difference between moral duty and epistemic duty. We cannot decide to believe what is evident because it is evident; so either there is no such thing as epistemic duty, or else epistemic duty is something other than this, in which case it could not be viewed as closely analogous to moral duty. (1) If you ought morally to do something, you can do it. (2) If you ought epistemically to believe something, you can believe it. Moral evaluations and epistemic evaluations do not answer to the same modal norms. Epistemic obligation does not imply epistemic possibility. Could you be blamed for not believing what is evident, if you really do not believe it? What could you do to in order to believe what you do not believe?

The Argument from Categorical Difference
The Argument from the Confusion between the Theoretical and the Practical
The Argument from the Moral Merit of Unjustified Beliefs
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