Montaigne and the Coherence of Eclecticism

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Since publication Pierre Hadot's essays on ancient philosophy by Arnold Davidson in 1995, 2 Michel Foucault's late work on the self3 has appeared in a new light. We now know that Hadot's work was familiar to Foucault as early as 1950s.4 It is also clear that Foucault's notion techniques is very close to what Hadot calls exercises. At same time, there are important differences between views these two philosophers, and Hadot has often expressed his regret that Foucault's untimely death prevented them from exploring these differences.5 One important point disagreement was status eclecticism. In Foucault's interpretation ancient philosophy, constitution implied a personal choice among disparate philosophical references: Writing as a personal exercise done by self and for is an art disparate truth.6 In a 1989 article Hadot argued from a historical point view that, so far as Stoicism and Epicureanism were concerned, eclecticism had no place in a mature practice philosophy. Foucault's favorite example, Seneca's Letters to Lucilius, in which Stoic arguments were invoked along with Epicurean arguments, was a work for beginners. In a mature practice Stoicism, one would stick to arguments Stoic school, choose them for their coherence, and instead trying to forge a spiritual identity for oneself through writing, one would liberate oneself from one's individuality in order to raise oneself up to universality.7 Hadot added that is only in New Academy - in person Cicero, for instance - that a personal choice is made according to what reason considers as most likely at a given moment.8 This discussion Foucault may give impression that Hadot was somewhat dismissive eclecticism. Yet in a 2001 interview Hadot claimed that he had always admired Cicero's intellectual independence, and he proposed a reappraisal of an attitude that has always had a bad reputation: eclecticism.9Something very similar is a stake in work Alexander Nehamas, as Lanier Anderson and Joshua Landy showed in their study his Art Living. In conception philosophy as a life (Hadot) or care (Foucault) or (Nehamas), a central issue is relationship between theoretical coherence and coherence person who theorizes. Elaborating on Nehamas's chapter on Montaigne, Anderson and Landy argue that there is a move in Montaigne away from doctrinal coherence and towards a coherence self. As they put it, the harmonious whole Montaigne commends [ . . . ] is not a coherent body fact or theory; it is unified self theorizer.10 Anderson and Landy show that this brings up all kinds difficulties: can this unified self be other than a fiction? If that is case, how can philosophy be a way life} Nehamas's answer is very much in spirit late Foucault: there is a coherence self in Montaigne, and this coherence is product as a philosophical activity. The self is fashioned through writing.Because Montaigne writes in ancient tradition philosophy as a way life, one may recall Hadot's suggestion that Foucault's notion writing is an intriguing but historically inaccurate description ancient philosophical practice. But perhaps Hadot agrees with Foucault after all, since in his most recent interviews, he speaks favorably eclecticism, a notion that is central to Foucault's analysis self-fashioning through writing. The case Montaigne is particularly interesting for these purposes, not only because Essays seem to be prototypical example writing self, but also because eclecticism is both discussed and practiced throughout Essays. I propose to take a fresh look at this issue by investigating status eclecticism in Montaigne's Essays. This must start with an examination philosophical tradition most closely associated with practice eclecticism, Skeptical tradition. …