Monopoly of scientific paradigms and goals of scientific knowledge

Abstract

The text that has been presented here offers a model of analysis based on the comparison of cumulative and relativistic approach in contemporary methodology and philosophy of science. The analysis is related to some of the most important problems of these disciplines, such as possibility of defining the falsification criteria for scientific theories or growth of scientific knowledge. Therefore, we have Popper (and later Lakatos) on one side, versus Kuhn on the other side. The analysis is conducted in a form of internal critique of uniformistic notion of scientific progress, in compliance with all the normative and formal requests of such argumentation. The emphases has been put on the development of conventionalism in modern science, which led to it's acceptance as a legitimate point of view in contemporary methodology. This happened due to the fact that the criteria for refuting scientific theories where constantly lowered when confronted with logical arguments derived from the very own structure of development of contemporary science. The main thesis of this work explains how aforementioned development of conventionalism implicates certain devastating consequences for methodology itself. Conventionalism encompasses by definition the external (social) factor of influence in every further development of methodology, seriously damaging the autonomy of science and scientific knowledge as well.