Monopolising the examining board system in England: a theoretical perspective in support of reform

Abstract

The fiascoes that seem to accompany the annual publication of examination results in England, the subsequent inquiries instituted to ensure they ‘never happen again’ and the Secretary of State’s decision, reversed six months later because of fears about possible EU legal challenges, to ‘end competition between exam boards’ raise some interesting issues about the way Examination Boards (or ‘Awarding Bodies’) operate in what is partly a competitive and partly a cooperative market. At the operational level, they need to make sufficient profit from the fees they charge schools to operate the assessment and awards system effectively; at the strategic level, they need to police the proliferation of awards so that some reasonable level of efficiency is obtained in the system. This paper models the education awards market such that the implications of the various alternative strategies for achieving the twin objectives of effectiveness and efficiency can be understood. It describes how Awarding Bodies cooperate and compete to maximise profit, and justifies the original decision in September 2012 by minister Gove to create a monopoly in the awards and assessment market.