Mongolia in 1983: Mixed Signals

Abstract

The process of Sino-Soviet consultations in 1983 posed a significant challenge to the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). Mongolia's response was twofold. On the one hand, the MPR leadership and press echoed Soviet sentiments for an improvement in relations; on the other, they seemingly placed obstacles in the path of improvement while taking a hard line. Consequently, 1983 was a year of mixed signals from the MPR. In early 1983 the soft line, supportive of improved relations, was predominant. Tsedenbal's anniversary greetings in January to the pro-Vietnamese Kampuchean leaders praised their success against imperialist and reactionary forces, omitting the standard hegemonist (a euphemism for China) portion of the triad of evils.' In February the MPR and China concluded an annual trade agreement that offered to significantly increase the volume.2 A Montsame article of February 15 commemorated the 33rd anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty, observing that in a time when the United States was supplying Taiwan with weapons and talking tough in commercial negotiations, many Chinese remember well the period of Sino-Soviet cooperation.3 Moderation of the MPR line was further demonstrated during the visit of Nicaragua's Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega to Ulaanbaatar in March. There was no effort by Mongolia's leaders to include an anti-Chinese statement in the final communique of the visit, while only a week later Ortega joined in a communique in Laos that strongly denounced Beijing.4 However, in April, not long after the conclusion of a round of Sino-Soviet talks, the Mongolian position abruptly hardened. Several articles in the Mongolian press delivered a major blast by declaring that while certain