Monads and Mathematics: Gödel and Husserl

Abstract

In 1928 Edmund Husserl wrote that “The ideal of the future is essentially that of phenomenologically based (“philosophical”) sciences, in unitary relation to an absolute theory of monads” (“Phenomenology”, Encyclopedia Britannica draft) There are references to phenomenological monadology in various writings of Husserl. Kurt Godel began to study Husserl’s work in 1959. On the basis of his later discussions with Godel, Hao Wang tells us that “Godel’s own main aim in philosophy was to develop metaphysics—specifically, something like the monadology of Leibniz transformed into exact theory—with the help of phenomenology.” (A Logical Journey: From Godel to Philosophy, p. 166) In the Cartesian Meditations and other works Husserl identifies ‘monads’ (in his sense) with ‘transcendental egos in their full concreteness’. In this paper I explore some prospects for a Godelian monadology that result from this identification, with reference to texts of Godel and to aspects of Leibniz’s original monadology.