Modern Format of Audit Activity Regulation

Abstract

The focus of this article is the paradigm of regulation of auditing activities at the present stage. The subject of the study is a number of provisions of the Concept of development of auditing activities until 2024. This program document determined the further vector of development of state regulation and self-regulation of auditing activities. The separate novelties of the legislation in the context of the modern format of regulation of audit activity are analyzed. The article summarizes the emergence of a "regulatory triangle" in the audit services market in connection with the granting of control powers to the Bank of Russia, which leads to excessive regulation of auditing activities. The main changes in the institute of self-regulation of auditing activities are noted: updating the conceptual apparatus, abandoning standardization and the numerical composition of the self-regulating organization. The article provides an assessment of a two-level system of requirements imposed on the subjects of audit activity. Positively assessing the institution of mandatory requirements, the author of the article is skeptical about the second direction of regulation - recommendations. Consideration of the recommendations as a prototype of the standards of a self-regulatory organization is not reflected in the legislation on auditing. The problems of excessive regulation of the audit services market due to the granting of control powers to the Bank of Russia are outlined. The author sees an opportunity to improve the quality of audit services provided in the form of a return to the practice of issuing qualification certificates in certain areas, in particular, in the direction of "audit of credit institutions". Thus, strict filtering of subjects should be carried out at the stage of access to the audit market, and control powers under this model should remain with the Federal Treasury and the self-regulatory organization. The refusal to standardize auditing activities, the functioning of only one self-regulating auditing organization devalues the very idea of self-regulation. Under such conditions, self-regulation of audit activity does not act as a worthy alternative or continuation of state regulation.