Models of Irish Unification Processes

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to identify and evaluate pathways to Irish unification that would be (a) constitutionally permissible in Ireland—i.e. the State currently governed by the Constitution of Ireland 1937—(b) consistent with the terms of the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement 1998 (GFA), and (c) consistent with the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Starting with the southern Irish perspective, we argue that bare unification does not require constitutional amendment, and could be achieved by a plebiscite or (probably) legislation. There are, however, many related changes frequently suggested in the context of unification that would require either a constitutional amendment or constitutional replacement in the South. Without evaluating the merits of any of these changes, we make an assumption—which we believe to be reasonable although contestable—that unification would involve at least some changes of this type. It follows that unification would involve a referendum, either to amend or replace the Constitution of Ireland 1937. We argue that the GFA requires that this referendum be concurrent with a referendum in Northern Ireland, although there is some ambiguity as to the meaning of ‘concurrence’. If both referendums favour unification, there is then an obligation on the Irish and British Governments to introduce and support in their respective parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish. Irish unification must therefore involve, if it is to meet the three criteria identified above, concurrent referendums North and South followed by legislation approved by Westminster and the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament). We go further, however, and specify three desiderata against which unification processes can be assessed. First, that those voting in referendums should be able to have a reasonably clear idea of what the implications of their vote. Second, that the processes should reduce the risk of the UK and Ireland diverging over the final constitutional status of Northern Ireland. Third, that the processes should allow for a wide range of consultation and negotiation over the constitutional and political structure of a unified Ireland, including extensive attempts to engage with the views of northern unionists. We identify several models that fit the legal parameters. We suggest, however, that the model that best meets the desiderata is one in which the form of a united Ireland is settled through negotiations prior to the referendums. The required legislation in Westminster and the Oireachtas should then follow as a matter of course.