Abstract
The article examines the mobilization measures carried out in Poland in 1939 and their impact on the deployment of the Polish armed forces in late August – early September and the subsequent “September catastrophe”. The authors draw attention to the fact that the reasons for Poland’s defeat in 1939 can be explained if we turn to the current issue of the mobilization of the Polish armed forces on the eve of the war, in the confidence of Polish politicians that the country would be supported by France and Britain. Understanding the role of Poland’s mobilization measures also affects the understanding of the reasons for the country’s defeat in 1939.
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