Abstract

This paper integrates institutional theories of the commons with insights from geography and human behavioral ecology to explore the spatial and temporal dynamics of artisanal fishing in Ecuador's coastal mangrove swamps. The focus is on the cockle fishery commons characterized by a mixture of formal institutional arrangements and an informal division of fishing space that partially influences fisher decisions about where and when to fish. Individual decisions are further explained to a certain degree by the patch choice model since fishers often move on to new grounds when their catch rates fall below average. These optimizing strategies requiring rotation within a socially produced fishing space may contribute to resource renewal, perceived reliable returns for individuals, and a relative stability in fishing effort, potentially mitigating against resource depletion in open-access areas not managed as a common property regime. This study of the interaction between shellfish harvesters, cultural institutions, and the environment contributes to a spatially explicit theory of the commons and points to the crucial role of resource user mobility and dynamic cultural institutions for the ecological sustainability of shellfish fisheries. A better understanding of feedback between individual decision-making and the self-organization of a social-ecological system has critical implications for policy design and fisheries management at similar scales.

Highlights

  • As a classic example of common pool resources, fisheries face many management challenges due to the difficulty of excluding individuals whose harvesting efforts are costly for a larger population of resource users who compete for the same resource space (Berkes, 2001; Berkes, 2005; Feeny, Berkes, McCay, & Acheson, 1990; Gordon, 1954)

  • This paper explores dynamic spatial and temporal patterns in the fishing effort on a micro-scale, focusing on fisher decisions and the role of resource user mobility over fishing space in Ecuador’s fishery for mangrove cockles (Anadara tuberculosa and A. similis)

  • Beitl increase in effort and decline in catch rates during April and June compared to March, a trend that is more pronounced during the Common pool resource (CPR) periods

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Summary

Introduction

As a classic example of common pool resources, fisheries face many management challenges due to the difficulty of excluding individuals whose harvesting efforts are costly for a larger population of resource users who compete for the same resource space (Berkes, 2001; Berkes, 2005; Feeny, Berkes, McCay, & Acheson, 1990; Gordon, 1954). Despite numerous theoretical advances about the crucial role of formal and informal institutions in environmental governance, the commons literature has given less explicit attention to how spatial-temporal dynamics of the commons are produced socially, politically and materially by various forms of human agency (Moss, 2014) and how system-level patterns can emerge out of the self-interested behaviors of individuals as a “precursor of governance” (Wilson, Yan, & Wilson, 2007) These questions are especially critical considering that research on the spatial dimensions of fishing behavior is of burgeoning interest in the fisheries science and management literature (Abernethy, Allison, Molloy, & Côté, 2007; Daw, 2008; Salas & Gaertner, 2004; Teh, Teh, & Meitner, 2012)

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