Abstract

Abstract : This monograph describes the stability phase of Operation Just Cause and its associated intelligence operations. it focuses on the intelligence aspects of the operation to answer the question: Does military doctrine adequately address tactical intelligence operations during the transition from war to peace? The monograph first provides a possible definition for the term stability operations, and describes the Just Cause stability phase and its related goals and tasks. Next, the paper examines stability phase-related tactical intelligence tasks and characteristics. The paper then provides an assessment of the relevancy of the data to future operations. Finally, this monograph evaluates current and emerging doctrine to determine if it adequately addresses tactical intelligence operations vis-a-vis stability operations. The monograph concludes that current doctrine does not adequately address tactical intelligence operations during the transition from war to peace. Current doctrine falls to define and describe the environment associated with this transition and, subsequently, does not foster improvements in intelligence doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Emerging doctrine, on the other hand, provides greater focus on this transitional period, thus improving the likelihood for corresponding action from proponents for the intelligence battlefield operating system. Emerging intelligence publications, while improving TTP for low intensity conflict stability operations, still lack the details necessary to prepare intelligence personnel properly for the tasks they may have to perform during this phase of operations. Tactical intelligence, Stability operations, Operation just cause, Low intensity conflict, Restoration operations, Intelligence operations.

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