Abstract
Abstract Contemporary low‐intensity conflict (LIC) policy and doctrine have been criticized as carrying forward the same concepts and assumptions that served as the foundation for the failed Vietnam‐War‐era U.S. counterin‐surgency policy. This article reviews and conceptually organizes the body of literature on LIC, then analyzes LIC doctrine and literature across four dimensions to determine if current LIC policy and doctrine have been revised to remedy the factors responsible for the failure of the United States’ Vietnam‐War‐era counterinsurgency doctrine. The analysis reveals that, although some positive doctrinal progress has occurred, there are dimensions of LIC doctrine and policy that have not yet been sufficiently addressed or resolved.
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