Abstract

This paper, examining the Hungarian example argues that that the price is high if a constitutional moment to adopt a constitution based on wide societal compromise has been missed. The constitution-making process might then be completed either by activist courts or by activist political forces. Hungary experienced two major constitutional reforms, both missing a consensual constitutional momentum. The first transformation in 1989–90, which replaced the socialist authoritarian system by democracy, was brought about by political elites, lacking democratic legitimacy, keeping the formal legal framework of the socialist constitution. The second reform in 2011 brought a formally new constitution (Fundamental Law of Hungary), initiated and adopted solely by the governing party (FIDESZ) with a constitutional majority, without consensus. The Constitutional Court both times attempted to play an active, corrective role in the aftermath of the constitution-making.

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