Abstract
ABSTRACT According to the mischaracterization objection developed by Max Deutsch and Herman Cappelen, philosophers do not appeal to intuitions as evidence for their judgments about thought experiment cases, but rather argue for their case judgments. Although Deutsch and Cappelen present numerous case studies in support of this claim, the reception of the mischaracterization objection has been surprisingly negative so far. In this paper, I will first clarify and elaborate the mischaracterization objection, explain its metaphilosophical significance, and then argue that all extant replies to it fail. The mischaracterization objection is therefore much stronger than it is widely assumed to be, with potentially far-reaching metaphilosophical consequences for the restrictionist challenge from experimental philosophy and the philosophical import of intuitions about hypothetical cases.
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