Illusionism about virtual causation

Abstract

ABSTRACT The question whether there are virtual objects grows more salient, as virtual reality (VR) technology becomes commercially viable. Arguments for realism about virtual objects rely on virtual causation. This paper argues that current accounts of virtual causation (both realist and irrealist) are inadequate – realists oversimplify the relation between virtual objects, virtual events, and their digital counterparts, while irrealists conflate virtual objects with their on-screen representations. Once these issues are rectified, it becomes clear that virtual causation is illusory, because the presumed structure of causal interactions between virtual objects does not map onto the structure of causal interactions between underlying computational objects and processes. Thus, the key realist contention that the causal interactions between virtual objects reveal their identity with the underlying computational objects and processes (digital objects) cannot be sustained. I conclude that an appropriate understanding of virtual causation favours irrealism about virtual objects.