Abstract
This article explores an action-reaction process which occurred between Japan and the U.S. in the years preceding World War II, focusing on the U.S.' imposition of economic sanctions. It maintains that these sanctions failed to deter the Japanese from pursuing their expansionist policy, and instead stimulated Japan's southward expansion and even its determination to go to war with the U.S. Miscalculations of the deterrent policy are ascribed to lack of understanding of the hard-line faction within the U.S. Govern ment as to the structure of Japan's foreign policy decision-making, and the psychology of the Japanese, in particular the military.
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