Domestic Constraints and the Imposition of Economic Sanctions

Abstract

What explains the decision to impose economic sanctions for coercive purposes? In this article, we seek to uncover the domestic political and economic conditions under which a sender state is more likely to resort to sanctions in a dispute with a target state. Since sanctions can be considered an arbitrary instrument of government intervention in international trade and finance, which has little to do with business interests, it is in the interests of domestic business to intervene in the decision to use sanctions. We argue that (1) the capability of the sender government in controlling its business sector and (2) constraints that result from domestic political institutions provide key conditions that explain the imposition of sanctions. We test our argument using the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions and Correlates of War data. Findings lend robust support for our theory that the sender state is more likely to use sanctions as the sender state’s ability to control its domestic economy increases with few veto constraints in policymaking process.