Abstract
In this paper I compare the strength of minority advocacy groups with regard to their potential to increase international pressure upon non-responsive European Union host-states of these minorities. It is my contention that even in this day and age, minorities in the EU are still seen as potential enemies from within, and that this perception negatively impacts their ability to achieve minority protection within their host-states. By applying an adapted version of Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) boomerang-model, within the context of a repetitive-game, I show how minorities that have a country of identification are better equipped to push their interests domestically, than those lacking an outside actor that might act on their behalf. I thus show that minorities in some cases 'can' in fact obtain adequate protection, but that this has little to do with humanitarian goals. Instead interstate interests dominate minority protection politics. Assuming that minority protection in the EU is more advanced, I argue that this kind of process is likely to be present in a more extreme form globally.
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