The Royal Navy and Japan, 1900–1920: Strategic Re-evaluation of the IJN

Abstract

Naval interest in Japan in the first two decades of the twentieth century embraced a variety of interests. The IJN, in terms of men and material, owed a great deal to British influence and thus there was a continuing interest in a former pupil. The high dependence on British technology, in terms of ships and equipment, also meant that in both peacetime and wartime Japan acted as a testbed for technology and operations which greatly interested British naval planners. The tremendous growth of the IJN, plus its victory over China, created a new non-European naval force in the Far East and forced the RN to evaluate Japan as either an opportunity or a threat. This period is dominated by seeing Japan as an opportunity but suspicions still existed and the threat from Japan, whether used as a budgetary/hypothetical or as a potential enemy, was always there and emerged in naval planning towards the end of this period. Naval policy for Japan was in many respects a subset of diplomatic and trade relations with the region and thus the Cabinet (especially the Prime Minister), Foreign Office, Treasury and even the Colonial Office exerted considerable influence. The political head of the Navy, the First Lord, was a civilian and a cabinet minister. He normally had no experience or even knowledge of naval affairs. Some, such as Lord Selborne, and especially Churchill, developed very considerable expertise on naval matters and thus exerted influence on both politicians and professional naval officers.