Abstract

AbstractThis article considers resilience of service networks that are composed of service and control nodes to node‐targeted attacks. Two complementary problems of selecting attacked nodes and placing control nodes reflect the interaction between the network operator and the network attacker. This interaction can be analyzed within the framework of game theory. Considering the limited performance of the previously introduced iterative solution algorithms based on non‐compact problem models, new compact integer programming formulations of the node attack optimization problem are proposed, which are based on the notion of pseudo‐components and on a bilevel model. The efficiency of the new formulations is illustrated by the numerical study that uses two reference networks (medium‐size and large‐size), and a wide range of the sizes of attacks and controllers placements.

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