Military rule in The Gambia: An interim assessment

Abstract

On 22 July 1994 the political system of the small West African state of The Gambia was subjected to an abrupt and dislocative change. On that day a group of very young junior officers from the Gambia National Army (GNA) staged a coup d'etat which succeeded in overthrowing the government of Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara and his People's Progressive Party (Ppp) which had ruled the country since independence in 1965.1 Before the coup Jawara had enjoyed the distinction of being the very last of that generation of African leaders who had led their countries to independence in the 1960s to remain in power.2 Since independence the Gambian political system had exhibited a level of continuity which was unique in the region. Although control of government had remained continuously in the hands of Jawara and his party, the country had experienced an unbroken run of multiparty politics in which opposition parties competed (rather unsuccessfully) for power in a regular series of free and relatively fair elections. While the operation of Gambian democracy was certainly not without flaws, it was real enough, and President Jawara had established an international reputation as a defender of human and civil rights.3 With the exception of a failed coup attempt by members of the paramilitary Field Force (this was before the creation of the army) in 1981, in conjunction with discounted urban elements, which had been defeated with the assistance of troops from neighbouring Senegal,4 the Gambian political system had also been markedly stable. It was thus rather ironic that, at a time when the regional trend was away from authoritarianism and towards the restoration of multiparty civilian rule, the Gambian political system was moving in the opposite direction and experiencing military rule for the first time.