Abstract

It has been over half a century since the landmark Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was adopted, for the first time unifying international drug policy under a single treaty aimed at limiting use, manufacture, trade, possession, and trafficking of opiates, cannabis, and other narcotics. Since then, other international drug policy measures have been adopted, largely emphasizing enforcement-based approaches to reducing drug supply and use. Recently, in response to concerns that the historic focus on criminalization and enforcement has had limited effectiveness, international drug policies have begun to undergo a paradigm shift as countries seek to enact their own reforms to partially depenalize or deregulate personal drug use and possession. This includes Mexico, which in 2009 enacted national drug policy reform partially decriminalizing possession of small quantities of narcotics for personal consumption while also requiring drug treatment for repeat offenders. As countries move forward with their own reform models, critical assessment of their legal compatibility and effectiveness is necessary. In this commentary we conduct a critical assessment of the compatibility of Mexico’s reform policy to the international drug policy regime and describe its role in the current evolving drug policy environment. We argue that Mexico’s reform is consistent with flexibilities allowed under international drug treaty instruments and related commentaries. We also advocate that drug policy reforms and future governance efforts should be based on empirical evidence, emphasize harm reduction practices, and integrate evidence-based evaluation and implementation of drug reform measures.

Highlights

  • It has been over half a century since the landmark, as amended by the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, was adopted (Single Convention), for the first time unifying international drug policy under a single treaty designed to limit the use, manufacture, trade, possession, and trafficking of opiates, cannabis, and other narcotic and similar drugs [1]

  • The effectiveness of enforcement-based approaches to reducing drug supply and limiting drug use which have been emphasized by a range of United Nations drug control bodies or organs—including the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), and the International Narcotics Board (INCB)—has been questioned, while concerns exist that a criminalization-based approach exacerbates negative health consequences for people who use drugs [1,2,8,9]

  • We argue that the evaluation and generation of empirical data to appropriately assess the impact of this reform is critical, given the evidence that drug-related harms remain pervasive in Mexico and given the potential that this reform may serve to inform future developments in drug policy reform in other settings [18,19]

Read more

Summary

Background

It has been over half a century since the landmark, as amended by the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, was adopted (Single Convention), for the first time unifying international drug policy under a single treaty designed to limit the use, manufacture, trade, possession, and trafficking of opiates, cannabis, and other narcotic and similar drugs [1]. Support for the international drug control governance regime and the policy approaches codified by these entities and instruments appears to be waning, with at least 30 countries enacting their own alternative approaches through domestic drug policy reform [10] These include policies of complete and partial deregulation/ decriminalization, or decisions by national governments to withdraw from or cease to enforce treaty obligations prohibiting personal use and possession of drugs [8,11]. Article 3 of The Illicit Trade Convention takes a more direct stance to addressing personal possession by calling for the criminalization of possession, purchase, or cultivation for personal consumption under domestic law and contains similar language limiting treaty obligations to a country’s constitutional principles or “basic concepts of its legal system”, a flexibility that could be broadly interpreted It remains unclear if Article 3 is binding on states as it defaults back to obligations of the Single Convention and CPS that do not appear to require penalization. Procedural issues requiring police to take confiscated drugs to authorities for weighing against threshold amounts introduce

11 April 1990
Conclusion
25. Noll A
31. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
36. Gunter D
46. International Drug Policy Consortium
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call