Abstract
Previous works have considered merging in weighted voting games using some well-known power indices, including Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. Bounds on the amount of power that strategic agents (or manipulators) are likely to gain for the simple case of when there are only two manipulators in the games exist. The bounds on the complicated case of when there are multiple strategic agents, until now, have remained open for the two indices. We use the Shapley-Shubik index and resolve one of these problems by providing two theoretical bounds on merging in weighted voting games with multiple strategic agents.
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
