Abstract
In a classic article, Oliver Williamson introduced the efficiency defense to antitrust merger analysis. In this article, I extend his analysis to mergers among buyers that may create monopsony power. When such mergers are accompanied by merger-specific efficiencies, there is necessarily a welfare tradeoff. Evaluating the impact of the merger on social welfare requires a comparison of the cost savings that can be realized only without the merger and the allocative inefficiency due to the exercise of monopsony power.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
