Abstract
This paper advances Motta’s (2004) study of two-firm Bertrand mergers with arbitrary synergies in symmetric linear models to m-firm mergers with cost-savings in asymmetric linear models. It identifies a set of Bertrand mergers that reduce not only consumer surplus but also rival firms’ profits. Such severely anti-competitive mergers are intriguing because they can never happen in both Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Nocke and Schutz (2018).
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