Mental Fictionalism As an Undermotivated Theory

Abstract

ABSTRACTOur paper consists of three parts. In the first part we explain the concept of mental fictionalism. In the second part, we present the various versions of fictionalism and their main sources of motivation. We do this because in the third part we argue that mental fictionalism, as opposed to other versions of fictionalism, is a highly undermotivated theory.1. What is Mental Fictionalism?We can distinguish between realist and antirealist approaches regarding each type of entity. You are a realist if you think that the entities of the type in question exist, and you are an antirealist if you think that they do not. You can be a realist about universals, physical objects, abstract entities and so on, while you remain an antirealist for example about God, scattered objects, or finkish dispositions.However, we need to distinguish how the realist or the antirealist approaches the ontological-metaphysical issues from how he approaches discourse. The focus of this latter distinction is not on the existence or non-existence of some entities, but on the features of our mode of speech about these entities.According to Kalderon (2005, 95-113), three distinct conditions have to be satisfied in order to be a realist about a discourse. (1) The sentences of the discourse express propositions about the putative subject matter of the discourse. (2) In uttering these sentences, we assert the truthconditions of the appropriate propositions. (3) At least most of these propositions are true-you are justified in accepting them.In accordance with orthodoxy, we call the discourse about the mental 'folk psychology'. So, the three conditions of discourse about folk psychology are the following: (1) Sentences of folk psychology express propositions about mental facts. (2) In uttering sentences of folk psychology, we assert the truth-conditions of the appropriate propositions, namely the obtaining of mental facts. (3) Most of these propositions represent mental facts correctly, so they are mostly true.'You are antirealist about folk psychology if you deny the satisfaction of at least one of the above conditions. Consequently, there are three possible antirealist positions.Mental nonfactualism denies the first criterion. According to this position, sentences of folk psychology do not express propositions. One could argue for this claim from some semantic and ontological considerations. Maybe you accept some form of verificationism, and you think there are no exact verificational criteria in the case of these sentences, so they are meaningless. Or maybe, you simply think there are no mental entities and consequently, the referring terms of folk psychology are empty, which means that a component of the putative proposition is missing, and therefore, there is no proposition. Again, you can think the same about the predicates of folk psychology: since mental properties are not instantiated, there are no semantic counterparts of these predicates.Eliminativism denies the third criterion. In contrast to the nonfactualist view, eliminativism says that the sentences of folk psychology express propositions, but these propositions are systematically false. In other words, propositions of folk psychology have representational content, but this content represents our minds falsely. So, eliminativism is an error theory of mind; it renders our beliefs about the mental definitely incorrect. Eliminativism is obviously not ontologically innocent either; it is committed to the nonexistence of mental facts posited by folk psychology.It seems to us that the difference between the nonfactualist and the eliminativist view heavily depends on some shaky semantic intuitions. Consider the famous debate between Bertrand Russell (1905) and Peter Strawson ( 1950) about sentences containing empty names or definite descriptions. If you have a Russellian intuition, you will claim that these sentences express false propositions, but if you have Strawsonian ones, you will take these sentences as expressing no propositions at all, because their existential presupposition is not satisfied. …