Mental Actions in Semantics On Abelard’s Question “Can a True Proposition Generate a False Understanding?”: A Tentative Interpretation

Abstract

Abstract This article aims to demonstrate the interdependence of semantics and noetics against the referentialist trend in Abelard studies conceiving semantics as confined to the truth/falsity function. The article takes as a turning point of the argument Abelard’s question “can a true proposition generate a false understanding?” which secondary literature does not take into account. Starting from the analysis of this question, the article aims to show the development of an enhanced notion of understanding compared to the Boethian one. The core of this enhanced notion of understanding is the action of attentio, which is the condition for the elaboration of a coherent and global definition of signification (de rebus and de intellectibus). The analysis of the mental action of attentio entails the description of other kinds of mental actions, leading one to conceive understanding as a multi-layered complex of actions.