Abstract
In this paper I want to examine Meinong’s account of what it is to think about a particular object in the context of issues that have preoccupied twentieth-century philosophy of language. The central interpretive task is to determine what Meinong might have said about cases of intending where the object is referred to by means of a (logically) proper name. The two theoretical notions at the heart of Meinong’s account of intending, intending by way of being (Seinsmeinen) and intending by way of being-so (Soseinsmeinen), are a species of singling an object out by means of an associated description. Since Kripke’s landmark discussion (1980), it is widely denied that descriptive accounts furnish an adequate account of intending. I will consider whether Meinong’s account has the resources to provide reassurance on this matter and whether the descriptive nature of his account raises other difficulties.
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