Revisiting Semantic Issues of Proper Names

Nguyen Viet Khoa

doi:10.5195/names.2022.2378

Abstract

The semantic status of proper names in linguistics and language philosophy has been comprehensively studied. It has long been held that proper names are mainly used to refer to certain entities, not to describe them. However, while Millian theorists claim that proper names do not possess a lexical meaning but directly refer to a certain entity, Fregean scholars assert that proper names do carry meanings, and the problem is just about the “meaning” employed. This paper argues that the Mill-Frege dichotomy can be bridged from the Vietnamese perspective by using proper name specifics of the Vietnamese language, and that as a cultural universal, names convey both denotational and connotational contents. However, the content of names can only be determined in each specific language community based on clarification of traditional and cultural values embodied in the naming process.

Highlights

Name researchers have long been interested in proper names and the problem posed by determining the meaning of proper names
The first argues that PNs have meaning, whereas the second one insists that PNs do not possess a lexical meaning but directly refer to a certain entity
As presented in this paper, PNs are meaningless if sense is understood as direct asserted lexical meaning, but PNs do have meaning if sense is construed as the content of names

Summary

Introduction

Name researchers have long been interested in proper names and the problem posed by determining the meaning of proper names (hereafter PNs). Mill (1851) held that names were nonconnotative, and he explained the “distinctive conditions of application for non-connotative terms”, but he did not accept that names required senses (Justice 2002, 567-76) It is not fully persuasive if one deals with PNs, as well as their reference and “meaning”, merely from a philosophical perspective because philosophers do not always take into account the distinction between established linguistic convention and language use. With regard to the sense of PNs, this paper’s argument is in line with van Langendonck’s position that names have meaning, “at least if presuppositional information can be called meaning” (2007, 85-86) Using his example “The king of Persia attacked Athens”, the researcher explains that the presupposed content is the king of Persia and the asserted meaning is “there existed a king of Persia long ago” (2007, 86). The purpose here is not to present a universal solution but to propose a linguistic/onomastic approach to build a bridge between differing views on the semantic status of PNs

Conclusion

Notes on the Contributor