Mediation, Domestic Politics, and the Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, 1991–2000

Abstract

Why did Israeli-Syrian negotiations (1991–2000) fail to lead to a peace treaty? They came very close, but Syria insisted on an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights to the 1967 line. At crucial talks in January 2000, Israel's prime minister decided against a deal with Syria because polls suggested a minority of Israelis supported a withdrawal to that line. His hesitance ruined the chances of an agreement in January and shaped the failed meeting in March 2000 between the U.S. and Syrian presidents. These negotiations suggest four lessons about mediation and negotiation: the hazards and benefits of a biased mediator; structural variables alone do not determine the outcome of negotiations; diplomatic ambiguity can be a destructive factor when the parties turn to implementation; and efforts to convince one's own constituents of the need for compromise are necessary though they may conflict with one's bargaining strategies. This article intensively focuses on the negotiating process and highlights the procedural decisions, substantive issues, and missed opportunities.