Abstract
I develop a model in which an incumbent with reelection concerns seeks to influence public opinion by strategically controlling the media’s access to information. I show that the incumbent’s optimal access strategy balances her demand for positive bias with the public’s demand for credible coverage. The media’s access increases with the competence of politicians over issues under public focus. Controlling media’s access can be instrumental in shaping public opinion, especially in the hands of popular incumbents. Persistence of key election issues, however, decreases the effectiveness of media access control by incumbents.
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