Mechanistic philosophies of development: Theodor Boveri and Eric H. Davidson

Abstract

Theodor Boveri’s (1862-1915) and Eric Davidson’s (1937-2015) achievements represent thoroughly two quite distant time frames in the history of the mechanistic approaches to development, that Jane Maienschein (2014) has characterized respectively as the era of the “experimental embryo” and of the “computed embryo”. Nonetheless, Davidson’s special bond to Boveri is meant to emphasize the genealogical continuity of an embryological tradition of mechanistic philosophy that, differently from molecular biology, is committed to an explanation of the hereditary transmission of organization. Davidson’s genealogical claim is reconsidered through a contextualized analysis of the function of machine-like models and of the role of experiment in the making of their respective mechanistic philosophies. This analysis may help to shed light on resilience and change in the understanding of a mechanistic approach to development.