Abstract
Mougenot and Matheson provide an interesting analysis on how some core ideas of the 'New Mechanists' - the proponents of a normative framework for scientific explanations based on the identification and description of mechanisms - might be relevant for the development of an embodied approach to cognitive neuroscience. Although we are highly sympathetic to such an approach, we struggle to identify the benefits of adopting the notion of mechanism for such enterprise.
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