Maze's direct realism and the character of cognition

Abstract

An exposition and critique of J. R. Maze's (1983) treatment of cognition forms the basis for arguments against the representative (or information processing) paradigm and an exposition of the alternative, direct realist, view. Against the representative view, it is argued that cognitive representations cannot really represent anything and that, consequently, the information processing paradigm is logically incoherent. A number of facets of direct realism are considered in detail, especially Maze's revival of the suggestion that cognition is observable in behaviour, his views about how we know our own cognitions, and the place of cognition in the explanation of behaviour. Furthermore, a possible account of non-veridical cognition is presented to counter the suggestion that error is a logically insurmountable problem for direct realism. Finally, some of the implications of direct realism for cognitive research are derived.