Market power evaluation in the electricity market based on the weighted maintenance object

Abstract

This article proposes a market power evaluation model for multiperiod and multiobject evaluation in the hydrodominated electricity market. This study aims to comprehensively evaluate the market power of hydropower enterprises in multiple periods, accurately identify the abuse of market power, and avoid monopolizing the market by hydropower enterprises. The market power evaluation model is constructed based on the improved weighted maintenance object (WMO), and the market power is evaluated through strength values. The developed model is applied to evaluate the market power problem involving the 52 hydropower stations owned by 16 owners in the southwestern region of China. The simulation results indicate that the individual market power of hydropower stations and owners with large installed capacity is generally higher. Moreover, the collusion market power of hydropower stations and owners is generally lower while the runoff is abundant. The abuse of collusion market power existed more commonly than that of individual market power. Furthermore, compared with the evaluation results of other multicriteria decision-marking models, the proposed model has better discrimination ability and higher agreement, and is more suitable for market power evaluation in this article. The research findings will help regulators supervise the market power of the hydrodominated electricity market and reduce the occurrence of electricity monopolies.