Maritime Forces and Counter-insurgency

Abstract

The contribution of maritime forces to counter-insurgency (COIN) operations is substantial, but generally overlooked. This article explains the characteristics of maritime forces and how these can prove to be advantages or disadvantages in COIN, both directly and also indirectly, in supporting the efforts of other armed services and agencies. It then explores a number of cases of British COIN campaigns – the Malayan Emergency (1948–1958), Cyprus (1954–1959), East Africa (1964), and the Indonesian Confrontation (1962–1967) – to show the range of roles that have been played by maritime forces. It argues that both operations at sea (such as blockades and patrolling, protecting shipping, intelligence-gathering, and deterring against escalation or involvement by external powers) and also operations from the sea (such as transportation of forces to and within the theatre, providing logistical support, conducting amphibious landings and strike operations, and various tasks relating to ‘hearts and minds’), can make a significant contribution to COIN campaigns. Maritime forces are well suited to contemporary operations at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict intensity.