Abstract

In times of widespread illegal fishing, fisheries law enforcement is a big challenge for coastal States which often lack the necessary resources to properly police their maritime zones (Internal Waters, Territorial Sea, Archipelagic Waters, and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)). As a result, enforcement efforts of coastal States often produce an insufficient “demonstration effect” (through monitoring, control and surveillance) and “deterrence effect” (through enforcement and sanctions). This inadequate enforcement capacity can be supplemented by inter-State cooperation and public-private partnerships with non-profit non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or other private entities such as for-profit private security companies (PSCs). However, environmental law enforcement powers such as search, question, arrest, and use of force are usually allocated to specific governmental law enforcement agencies such as the coast guard, environmental government agencies, customs agencies, or the navy. This raises the question if, and to what extent, other States or private actors such as NGOs and PSCs could assist in or take over law enforcement functions. The present article will approach this issue from an international legal perspective. It will first provide case-studies of inter-State cooperation and public-private partnerships in fisheries law enforcement for factual background. Particularly attention will be paid to parallels in the practice of inter-State cooperation and public-private partnerships. The case-studies will be followed by a legal analysis from the perspective of public international law with a focus on the international law of the sea. Finally, the article will offer some general conclusions about the legality of such cooperation schemes as well as practical potentials and risks associated with them.

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