Abstract
This paper tests the theory of mixed strategy equilibrium using Maradona's penalty kicks during his lifetime professional career. The results are remarkably consistent with equilibrium play in every respect: (i) Maradona's scoring probabilities are statistically identical across strategies; (ii) His choices are serially independent. These results show that Maradona's behavior is consistent with Nash's predictions, specifically with both implications of von Neumann's Minimax Theorem.
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